Literature Review CrM
Published:
University of Paris Dauphine - PSL
| Paper | Type of model | Market area | Design criteria | Market power | Uncertainty | Investment cycl. | Efficiency | Crossborder | High RES | Flexible Res. | CRM Typology | Source of risk | Actors | Actor asymmetry | Information asymmetry | Risk aversion | Technology | Cost type | Lead time | Penalty | Industrial decisions | EOM | Capacity market | Model resolution | Forward capacity auction | Capacity product | Clearing EOM | Clearing CRM | Publication |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Abani et al. (2016) | SD | hypothetical | - | - | yes | yes | - | - | - | - | CM - SR | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Abani, A.O., Hary, N., Rious, V., Saguan, M., 2018. The impact of investors’ risk aversion on the performances of capacity remuneration mechanisms. Energy Policy 112, 84–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.10.008. | |
| Abani et al. (2018) | SD | hypothetical | - | - | yes | yes | yes | - | - | - | CM | Demand / EOM | Producers | - | - | CVAR | Peak | O&M / I(k) | Yes | - | Entry Exit | - | PPC | 4 stages ( Forecast / CRM / Decision / EOM ) | 4 years | 1 year | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Abani, A.O., Hary, N., Saguan, M., Rious, V., 2016. Risk aversion and generation adequacy in liberalized electricity markets: benefits of capacity markets. 2016 13th Inter-tio-l Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM). pp. 1–5. https:// doi.org/10.1109/EEM.2016.7521264. |
| Allcott (2012) | Analytique | PJM | yes | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CM-C | - | Producers / Consumers | Incumbents / New Entry / RTP consumers / Flat rates consumers | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC | PPC | Profit maximisation | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Allcott, H. (2012). Real-time pricing and electricity market design. | |
| Assili et al. (2008) | SD | hypothetical | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | - | CP | Demand | Producers | - | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base | c / I(k) | Yes | - | Entry Exit | PPC | - | Decision loop | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | Assili, M., Javidi, D.B., Hossein, M., Ghazi, R., 2008. An improved mechanism for capacity payment based on system dy-mics modeling for investment planning in competitive electricity environment. Energy Policy 36, 3703–3713. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.enpol.2008.06.034. | |
| Astier et Lambin (2019) | Analytique | hypothetical | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | SR - RO | Demand / marg, cost | Producers / Consumers | - | yes | - | Single | - | - | - | - | - | - | Profit maximisation | - | - | - | Nicolas Astier et Xavier Lambin, « Ensuring Capacity Adequacy in Liberalised Electricity markets », The Energy Jour-l, vol. 40, n° 3, mai 2019. | |
| Bajo Buenestado (2017) | Analytique | Texas (ERCOT) | - | yes | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CP | Demand | Producers | Partial monopoly / Stackelberg | - | - | Peak / Base | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | Fabra | - | 2 stages ( Decision / EOM ) | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | Bajo-Buenestado, R., 2017. Welfare implications of capacity payments in a pricecapped electricity sector: a case study of the Texas market (ERCOT). Energy Econ. 64, 272–285. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2017.03.026. | |
| Barrosso et al (2008) | Optimization | hypothetical | - | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | - | Multiple | Producers | - | - | CVAR | Multiple | - | - | - | Capacity | - | - | Decision loop | - | - | - | - | |
| Bhagwat et al. (2017a) | Agent-Based | hypothetical based on Germany | - | - | yes | yes | - | - | yes | - | CM | Multiple | Producers | - | - | - | Multiple | c / O&M / I(k) | Yes | - | Entry Exit | PPC | PPC | 4 stages ( Debt / CM / Decision / EOM ) | 1 year | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Bhagwat, P.C., Iychettira, K.K., Richstein, J.C., Chappin, E.J., de Vries, L.J., 2017a. The effectiveness of capacity markets in the presence of a high portfolio share of renewable energy sources. Util. Policy 48, 76–91. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup. 2017.09.003. | |
| Bhagwat et al. (2017b) | Agent-Based | hypothetical based on the United Kingdom | - | - | yes | yes | - | - | - | - | CM | Demand / Fuel | Producers | Incumbent / New Entrant | - | - | Multiple | c / O&M / I(k) | Yes | - | Entry Exit | PPC | PPC | 4 stages ( Debt / CM / Decision / EOM ) | 1 year / 4 years | 1 year / Multi years | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid for both Annuel et Multi Annuel Contracts | Bhagwat, P.C., Marcheselli, A., Richstein, J.C., Chappin, E.J., de Vries, L.J., 2017b. An a-lysis of a forward capacity market with long-term contracts. Energy Policy 111, 255–267. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.09.037. |
| Briggs and Kleit (2013) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CP | Demand | Producers | - | - | - | Peak / Base | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC / Cournot | PPC / Cournot | Profit maximisation | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | Briggs, R.J., Kleit, A., 2013. Resource adequacy reliability and the impacts of capacity subsidies in competitive electricity markets. Energy Econ. 40, 297–305. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2013.07.009. | |
| Brown, D., (2018) | Analytique | hypothetical | yes | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Capacity Demand / EOM | Producers | Partial monopoly | - | - | Single | O&M / I(k) | - | - | Entry | - | M.U.A. | 2 stages ( CM / EOM ) | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Brown, D. P. (2018). The effect of subsidized entry on capacity auctions and the long-run resource adequacy of electricity markets. Energy Economics, 70, 205–232. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2018.01.002 | |
| Brown, D., (2018) | Analytique | hypothetical | yes | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Capacity Demand / EOM | Producers / Public Auth. | Partial monopoly / Stackelberg | - | - | Single | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity / Mothballing | M.U.A. | M.U.A. | 6 stages ( Public Auth. / Invest / Decision / CM / EOM ) | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Brown, D.P., 2018. Capacity payment mechanisms and investment incentives in restructured electricity markets. Energy Econ. 74, 131–142. | |
| Cepeda and Finon (2011) | SD | hypothetical | - | - | yes | yes | - | - | - | - | CM | Demand / Invest. Unavailability | Producers | - | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base | c / I(k) | Yes | Yes | Entry Exit | PPC | PPC | 4 stages ( Forecast / CM / Decision / EOM ) | 3 years | 1 year | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Cepeda, M., Finon, D., 2011. Generation capacity adequacy in interdependent electricity markets. Energy Policy 39, 3128–3143. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011. 02.063. |
| Cepeda and Finon (2013) | SD | hypothetical based on France | - | - | - | - | - | - | yes | yes | CM | Multiple | Producers | - | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base | c / I(k) | Yes | Yes | Entry Exit | PPC | PPC | 4 stages ( Forecast / CM / Decision / EOM ) | 3 years | 1 year | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Cepeda, M., Finon, D., 2013. How to correct for long-term exter-lities of large-scale wind power development by a capacity mechanism? Energy Policy 61, 671–685. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.06.046. |
| Christiansen PN (2016) | Stochastic | hypothetical | - | - | - | - | yes | - | - | yes | CM | - | Producers / Consumerss | Flexible / Non flexible | - | - | Peak / Base | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC | PPC | Optimization | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Christiansen PN. Equilibrium modeling of a power market with a capacity market designed to promote flexible capacity. NTNU; 2016 | |
| Creti and Fabra (2007) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers / Public Auth. | Monopole | - | - | Single | K | - | - | Capacity | PPC / monopoly | PPC / monopoly | 3 stages ( Public Auth. / CM / EOM ) | - | - | - | Creti, A., Fabra, N., 2007. Supply security and short-run capacity markets for electricity: why an ICAP mechanism is needed as part of standard market design. Energy Econ. 29, 259–276. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2006.04.007. | |
| Ehrenmann and Smeers (2011) | Stochastic | hypothetical | - | yes | yes | - | - | - | - | - | CM | Fuel / Regulation | Producers | - | - | CVAR | Peak / Mid / Base | O&M / I(k) / CO2 | - | - | Entry | PPC | - | 2 stages ( Decision / EOM ) | - | - | - | Ehrenmann, A., Smeers, Y., 2011. Generation capacity expansion in a risky environment: a stochastic equilibrium a-lysis. Oper. Res. 59, | |
| Elberg, C., & Kranz, S. (2013) | Analytique | hypothetical | yes | yes | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers | Partial monopoly | - | - | Single | c / I(k) | - | - | Entry | M.U.A. | Cournot | 2 stages ( CM / EOM ) | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Elberg, C., & Kranz, S. (2013). Capacity Mechanisms and Effects on Market Structure. (14), 1–21. | |
| Fabra (2018) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers | Partial monopoly | yes | - | - | K | - | - | Entry | PPC | PPC / Partial monopoly | 2 stages ( Decision / EOM ) | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Exogène : fixé par le First Best Sol. | Fabra N. A primer on capacity mechanisms. Energy Econ. 2018;75:323-335. | |
| Fan et al. (2012) | Stochastic | hypothetical | - | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | CM | Demand / Regulation | Producers | Incumbent / New Entrant | - | Utility function | Peak / Mid / EnR | c / O&M / I(k) / CO2 | - | - | Entry Capacity | PPC | - | 2 stages ( Decision / EOM ) | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Fan, L., Norman, C.S., Patt, A.G., 2012. Electricity capacity investment under risk aversion: a case study of coal, gas, and concentrated solar power. Energy Econ. 34, 54–61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2011.10.010. | |
| Franco et al. (2015 | SD | Great Britain | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | - | CM | Multiple | Producers | - | - | - | Multiple | c / O&M / I(k) | Yes | - | Entry Exit | PPC | PPC | 4 stages ( Forecast / CM / Decision / EOM ) | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Franco, C.J., Castaneda, M., Dyner, I., 2015. Simulating the new British electricitymarket reform. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 245, 273–285. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor. 2015.02.040. | |
| Genoese et al. (2012) | Agent-Based | hypothetical based on Spain | - | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CP | - | Producers / Consumers / Public Auth. | - | - | - | Multiple | c / O&M / I(k) / CO2 | - | - | Capacity | PPC | - | Decision loop | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | Genoese, M., Genoese, F., Fichtner, W., 2012. Model-based a-lysis of the impact of capacity markets on electricity markets. 2012 9th Inter-tio-l Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2012). pp. 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1109/EEM. 2012.6254704. | |
| Geze (2013) | Agent-Based | France | - | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | CM | Demand / Fuel | Producers / Consumers | - | - | Mean Variance | Multiple | - | - | - | Entry | - | PPC | Decision loop | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | |
| Gurkan et al (2013) | Stochastic | hypoothetical | - | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers / Consumers / Public Auth. | - | - | - | Multiple | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC | PPC | 2 stages ( Decision / EOM ) | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Gurkan, G., Ozdemir, O., & Smeers, Y. (2013). Generation Capacity Investments in Electricity Markets: Perfect Competition. Ssrn. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2314862 | |
| Hach et al. (2016) | SD | Great Britain | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers | Ramping Rates | - | - | Multiple | c / O&M / I(k) / CO2 | - | - | Entry Exit | PPC | PPC | Converging price | 1 year / Multi years | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Hach, D., Chyong, C.K., Spinler, S., 2016. Capacity market design options: a dy-mic capacity investment model and a GB case study. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 249, 691–705. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.08.034. | |
| Hasani and Hosseini (2013) | SD | hypothtical | - | - | yes | yes | - | - | - | - | CP | Demand | Producers | Raming rates | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base | c / O&M / I(k) | Yes | - | Entry Exit | PPC | PPC | Decision loop | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Hasani, M., Hosseini, S., “Dy-mic assessment of capacity investment in electricity market considering complementary capacity mechanisms”. Energy, vol.36, 2011, pp 277-293 | |
| Hobbs et al. (2007) | SD | hypothetical | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers | - | - | Utility function | Peak | K | Yes | - | Entry | - | PPC | Decision loop | 4 years | 1 year | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Hobbs, B.F., Hu, M.-C., Inon, J.G., Stoft, S.E., Bhavaraju, M.P., 2007. A dy-mic a-lysis of a demand curve-based capacity market proposal: the PJM reliability pricing model. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 22, 3–14. https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2006. 887954. |
| Höschle et al. (2017) | Stochastic | Belgium | - | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | - | Producers / Consumers / Public Auth. | - | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base / EnR | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC | PPC | Optimization | - | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Höschle, H., de Jonghe, C., Le Cadre, H., Belmans, R., 2017. Electricity markets for energy, flexibility and availability – impact of capacity mechanisms on the remuneration of generation technologies. Energy Econ. 66, 372–383. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.06.024. |
| Joskow and Tirole (2007 | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CP | Demand | Producers / Consumers | - | - | - | Peak / Base | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC / Cournot | - | Profit maximisation | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | Joskow, P., Tirole, J., 2007. Reliability and competitive electricity markets. RAND J. Econ. 38, 60–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00044.x. |
| Joung, M., Baldick, R., Kim, J. (2009) | Analytique | hypothetical | yes | yes | yes | - | - | - | - | - | CM | - | Producers / Public Auth. | - | yes | - | Single | - | - | Yes | - | - | Cournot | Nash equilibrium | - | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Joung, M., Baldick, R., & Kim, J. (2009). Strategic behavior in electricity capacity markets. Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Hawaii Inter-tio-l Conference on System Sciences, HICSS, 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2009.404 |
| Khalfallah (2009) | Stochastic | hypothetical | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | CM - RO | Demand | Producers | Stackelberg | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base | c / I(k) | Yes | Yes | Capacity | Cournot | Cournot | 3 stages ( Decision / CM / EOM ) | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Khalfallah, M. H. (2009). A Game Theoretic Model for Generation Capacity Adequacy in Electricity Markets: A Comparison between Investment Incentive Mechanisms. Ssrn. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1405291 |
| Kim and Kim (2012) | Stochastic | South Korea | - | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Public Auth. | - | - | - | Multiple | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PCC | PPC | Optimization | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Kim, H., Kim, S.-S., 2012. The resource adequacy scheme in the Korean electricity market. Energy Policy 47, 133–144. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.04.035. Kwoka, J., Madjarov, K., 2007. Making markets work: the special case of electricity. Electr. J. 20, 24–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2007.10.008. |
| Kraft E. (2017) | Agent-Based | France | - | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Multiple | Producers / Consumers / Public Auth. | - | - | - | Multiple | c / O&M / I(k) | Yes | - | Entry Exit | PCC | PPC | Decision loop | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Kraft E. (2017) Modelling a Decentralised Capacity Markets |
| Léautier (2016) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM - RO | Demand | Producers / Consumers | RTP consumers / Flat rates consumers | - | - | Single | c / I(k) | - | Yes | Entry | PPC / Cournot | Cournot | 3 stages ( Decision / CM / EOM ) | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Léautier, T.-O., 2016. The visible hand: ensuring optimal investment in electric power generation. Energy J. 37, https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.37.2.tlea. |
| LeCadre, H., Soubra, M. (2014) | Analytique | hypothetical | yes | yes | - | - | yes | - | - | yes | CM | - | Producers / Consumers / Public Auth. | Stackelberg / Exogenous preferences | yes | - | Multiple | c | - | Yes | Capacity | PPC / Stackelberg | - | 4 stages ( Decision Prod, EOM Prod, Decision Demand, EOM Demand ) | - | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Hélène Le Cadre, Michaël Soubra. Designing Rules for the Capacity Market. [Research Report] Working Paper 2013-03-10, Chaire Modélisation prospective au service du développement durable. 2013, pp.36 - Les Cahiers de la Chaire. |
| Lynch andDevine (2017 | Stochastic | hypothetical | - | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | C¨P | Invest. Unavailability | Producers | - | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base | c / O&M / I(k) / Refurbushment | - | - | Entry Exit / Refurbishment | PPC | PPC | Optimisation | - | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Lynch, M.Á., Devine, M.T., 2017. Investment vs. refurbishment: examining capacity payment mechanisms using stochastic mixed complementarity problems. Energy J. 38, https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.38.2.mlyn. |
| Maere d’Aertrycke et al. (2017) | Stochastic | hypothetical | - | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM - RO | Demand / Invest. Unavailability | Producers / Consumerss | - | - | CVAR | Peak / Base | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC | PPC | 2 stages ( Décision / EOM ) | - | - | - | - | de Maere dAertrycke, G., Ehrenmann, A., Smeers, Y., 2017. Investment with incomplete markets for risk: the need for long-term contracts. Energy Policy 105, 571–583. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.01.029. de Sisternes, F.J., Parsons, J.E., 2016. The Impact of Uncertainty on the Need and Design of Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms in Low-carbon Power Systems. |
| Mastropietro, P., et al (2016) | Agent-Based | hypothetical | yes | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Invest. Unavailability | Producers | Incumbent / New Entrant | - | - | Peak | K | - | Yes | Entry | PPC | PPC | Cost minimization scenario | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Mastropietro, P., Herrero, I., Rodilla, P., Batlle, C., 2016. A model-based a-lysis on the impact of explicit pe-lty schemes in capacity mechanisms. Appl. Energy 168, 406–417. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.01.108. |
| McRaey, S., Wolak, F., (2019) | Analytique | Colombie | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | - | RO | - | Producers | Partial monopoly | - | - | Peak / Base | - | - | - | - | Cournot | - | Profit maximisation | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | McRae, S., Wolak, F. A. (2019). Market power and incentive-based capacity payment mechanisms. 1–44. |
| Meyer and Gore (2015) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | - | - | yes | yes | - | - | RO - SR | Demand | Producers | - | - | - | Multiple | c / I(k) | - | - | Exit | Markup | PPC | Profit maximisation | - | - | - | - | Meyer, R., Gore, O., 2015. Cross-border effects of capacity mechanisms: do uncoordi-ted market design changes contradict the goals of the European market integration? Energy Econ. 51, 9–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2015.06. 011. |
| Milstein I, Tishler A. (2019) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CP | Demand | Producers | - | - | - | Single | c / I(k) | - | - | Entry | Cournot | - | 2 stages ( Decision / EOM ) | - | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Milstein I, Tishler A. On the effects of capacity payments in competitive electricity markets: Capacity adequacy, price cap, and reliability. Energy Policy. 2019;129(February):370-385. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2019.02.028 |
| Petitet (2017) | SD | hypothetical | - | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Petitet, M, 2017. Effects of risk aversion on investment decisions in electricity generation: What consequences for market design. |
| Schneider et al (2017) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers / Consumers | - | - | - | Single | c | - | - | - | Cournot | Cournot | Profit maximisation | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Forward Contracts and Generator Market Power: How Exter-lities Reduce Benefits in Equilibrium. Ian Schneider, Audun Botterud, and Mardavij Roozbehani. Proceedings of the US Association for Energy Economics, 2017. Presentation Slides, November 2017. |
| Schwenen (2014) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | - | - | yes | - | - | yes | CM | Demand | Producers | - | - | - | - | - | - | Yes | Capacity | M.U.A. | M.U.A. | 2 stages ( CM / EOM ) | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Schwenen, S., 2014. Market design and supply security in imperfect power markets. Energy Econ. 43, 256–263. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2014.02.012. |
| Schwenen (2015) | Analytique | New York (ICAP) | yes | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | CM | - | Producers | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Capacity | - | M.U.A. | Profit maximisation | - | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Schwenen, S., 2015. Strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions with capacity constrained bidders: the New York capacity market. RAND J. Econ. 46, 730–750. https://doi. org/10.1111/1756-2171.12104. |
| Teirila, J. (2017) | Analytique | Irlande | - | yes | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | RO | - | Producers | Fringe comp. | - | - | Multiple | c / I(k) | - | - | Entry Exit | PPC / Cournot | PPC / Cournot | 3 stages ( Decision / CM / EOM ) | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Descending clock auction | Teirila, J. (2017) Market Power in the Capacity Market? The Case of Ireland, Cambridge Working Paper in Economics, 1727 |
| Traber (2017) | Stochastic | Germany, France, and Poland | - | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | SR - CM | Demand | Producers / Consumers | - | - | - | Multiple | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC | PPC | Profit maximisation | - | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Traber, T., 2017. Capacity remuneration mechanisms for reliability in the integrated European electricity market: effects on welfare and distribution through 2023. Util. Policy 46, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2016.10.005. |
| Winzer (2013) | Agent-Based | Great Britain | - | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CP - RO | Dermande | Producers / Public Auth. | - | yes | Mean Variance | Multiple | c / I(k) | - | - | Entry | PPC | - | Decision loop | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | Winzer, C., 2013. Robustness of various capacity mechanisms to regulatory errors. 2013 10th Inter-tio-l Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM). pp. 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1109/EEM.2013.6607374. |
| Peluchon (2019) | Stochastic | Hypothetical | - | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Benoît Peluchon (EDF), « Market Design and the Cost of Capital for Generation Capacity Investment » |
| Feng et Xu (2009) | Analytique | Chi- | - | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers / Public Auth. | - | yes | Utility function | Peak / Mid / Base | c / O&M / I(k) | - | Yes | - | PPC | PPC | Profit maximisation | - | - | - | - | D. Feng and Z. Xu, "Risk a-lysis of volume cheat strategy in a competitive capacity market," 2009 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting, Calgary, AB, 2009, pp. 1-7. |